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MICHAEL C. DORF & NEIL S. SIEGEL
“Early-Bird Special” Indeed!: Why the Tax Anti-
Injunction Act Permits the Present Challenges to the 
Minimum Coverage Provision
In view of the billions of dollars and enormous effort that might otherwise be 
wasted, the public interest will be best served if the Supreme Court of the United 
States reaches the merits of the present challenges to the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) during its October 2011 Term. Potentially standing in the 
way, however, is the federal Tax Anti-Injunction Act (TAIA), which bars any “suit 
for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.” The dispute to 
date has mostly turned on the fraught and complex question of whether the ACA’s 
exaction for being uninsured qualifies as a “tax” for purposes of the TAIA. We argue 
that the Supreme Court need not resolve this issue because the TAIA does not apply for 
a distinct reason: the present challenges to the ACA do not have “the purpose” of 
restraining tax assessment or collection. In order for the TAIA not to bar refund suits, 
the TAIA must be read to bar suits with the immediate purpose of restraining tax 
assessment or collection. The present challenges do not have such an immediate 
purpose because the very authority to assess or collect will not exist until long after the 
litigation is concluded. Among other virtues, this resolution of the TAIA question does 
not predetermine whether the tax power justifies the minimum coverage provision.
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introduction
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)1 requires most 
people lawfully living in the United States to obtain a certain level of health 
insurance coverage (the minimum coverage provision) or pay a certain amount 
of money each year (the shared responsibility payment), a payment the ACA 
labels a “penalty.”2 These provisions go into effect on January 1, 2014. For all 
the heated disputes over their constitutionality, there ought to be universal 
agreement on the question of litigation timing. The public interest will be best 
served if the Supreme Court of the United States decides the constitutional 
questions sooner rather than later, in a pre-enforcement challenge to the law’s 
exaction for going without insurance, rather than in a post-enforcement 
challenge no earlier than 2015, when the first actions for refunds could be 
brought. Substantial delay would invite waste and chaos. Many federal 
agencies, states, insurers, providers, and individuals would have to endure 
years of legal uncertainty, during which time billions of dollars and enormous 
effort would be expended implementing the myriad provisions of the ACA.3
Some or all of these provisions may not survive if the minimum coverage 
provision is invalidated, in which case all that money and effort will have been 
wasted. This is no small price to pay, particularly in difficult economic times. 
Call this concern a “mere” policy argument; call it prudential, pragmatic, or 
practical. Call it what you will, but it is present, palpable, and powerful.
But is reaching the merits lawful? In Liberty University, Inc. v. Geithner,4 the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that the plaintiffs’
constitutional challenge to the minimum coverage provision was barred by the 
federal Tax Anti-Injunction Act (TAIA).5 This statute, which was originally 
1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended by Health Care and Education 
Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (to be codified primarily in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
2. Id. § 1501(b), 124 Stat. at 244 (to be codified at I.R.C. § 5000A).
3. For Congressional Budget Office estimations of some of these costs, see infra note 49.
4. No. 10-2347, 2011 WL 3962915 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011).
5. I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2006). Although courts often refer to the federal Tax Anti-Injunction Act 
as the AIA, we call it the TAIA to distinguish it from the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2283 (2006), which is universally denominated the AIA and which provides that “[a] court 
of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except 
as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to 
protect or effectuate its judgments.” Both the TAIA and the AIA are distinct from the state 
Tax Injunction Act (TIA), 28 U.S.C. § 1341, which provides that “[t]he district courts shall 
not enjoin, suspend or restrain the assessment, levy or collection of any tax under State law 
where a plain, speedy and efficient remedy may be had in the courts of such State.”
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enacted in 1867,6 provides in relevant part that “no suit for the purpose of 
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any 
court.”7 The Supreme Court has described the purpose of the TAIA as 
safeguarding “prompt collection of . . . lawful revenue” by precluding taxpayers 
from filing pre-enforcement challenges to “disputed sums.”8 The Fourth 
Circuit held that a federal exaction may qualify as a “tax” under the TAIA even 
if it falls outside of the constitutional power of Congress to lay and collect 
taxes.9 In other words, the court concluded that the meaning of the word “tax”
in the TAIA is broader than its meaning in the Constitution. “[A]n exaction 
constitutes a ‘tax’ for purposes of the [T]AIA,” the court wrote, “so long as the 
method prescribed for its assessment conforms to the process of tax 
enforcement.”10 Because the method prescribed for assessment of the ACA 
exaction indeed conforms to the process of tax enforcement, the court held that 
it lacked jurisdiction to consider whether the minimum coverage provision falls 
within the tax power,11 the Commerce Clause,12 or the Necessary and Proper 
Clause.13
The federal judges who have disagreed with the Fourth Circuit majority 
have relied on a single set of arguments to show that the exaction is not a tax 
under either the TAIA or the Constitution.14 They have focused on the fact that 
Congress labeled the ACA exaction for going without insurance a “penalty”
rather than a “tax.”15 These arguments about the statutory definition of the 
6. Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon (Bob Jones I), 416 U.S. 725, 731 (1974).
7. I.R.C. § 7421(a).
8. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962).
9. Liberty Univ., 2011 WL 3962915, at *5.
10. Id.
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
12. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
13. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
14. Some judges have not reached the constitutional question of whether the exaction is a tax. 
See, e.g., Liberty Univ., 2011 WL 3962915, at *24 n.2 (Davis, J., dissenting) (arguing that the 
ACA is constitutional under the Commerce Clause and not reaching the tax question). Judge 
Diana Motz, who authored the panel majority opinion, declined to reach the merits of any of 
the constitutional questions.
15. Compare, e.g., Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 539 (6th Cir. 2011) 
(“Congress’s choice of words—barring litigation over ‘tax[es]’ in section 7421 but imposing 
a ‘penalty’ in section 5000A—suggests that the former does not cover the latter.”), with, e.g., 
id. at 551 (Sutton, J., concurring in part and delivering the opinion of the court in part) 
(concluding that the exaction in the ACA for remaining uninsured was a penalty because, 
among other things, “that is what Congress said,” and its “central function . . . was not to 
raise revenue,” but “to change individual behavior by requiring all qualified Americans to 
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term “tax” in the TAIA closely parallel arguments that have been made 
regarding the constitutional question of whether the ACA’s minimum coverage 
provision and shared responsibility payment can be sustained as an exercise of 
Congress’s power to lay and collect taxes.16
This Essay takes a different approach. Rather than determining whether 
the meaning of the word “tax” in the TAIA is broader than, coextensive with, 
or sometimes narrower than its meaning in the Constitution, we focus on other 
language in the TAIA statute. We begin by noting that, to avoid absurdity, one 
must read the TAIA as if it barred suits having the immediate purpose of 
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax. One must read the statute 
this way because otherwise it would bar even post-enforcement constitutional 
challenges. Such challenges may have the primary purpose of preventing future 
assessments or collections in addition to the immediate purpose of avoiding 
payment of past assessments or collections, yet they are clearly permissible 
notwithstanding the literal language of the TAIA.
Once one accepts that the word “purpose” in the TAIA means “immediate 
purpose,” it becomes evident that the TAIA does not bar the present pre-
enforcement challenges to the ACA. Even assuming arguendo that the ACA 
exaction for going without insurance qualifies as a “tax” for purposes of the 
TAIA, the present challenges do not have “the [immediate] purpose of 
restraining the assessment or collection”17 of this tax because the legal authority 
to assess and collect it will not exist until 2015. In other words, the most 
sensible reading of the TAIA’s text and purpose is that it does not apply until 
the authority to assess and collect taxes has come into being, just as it does not 
apply after that authority has been exercised. Rather than having the 
immediate purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of taxes, the 
present challenges to the minimum coverage provision have the immediate 
obtain medical insurance”). See also Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011) 
(“Nothing we have seen suggests that Congress intended for ‘any tax’ in the Anti-Injunction 
Act to include exactions unrelated to taxes that Congress labeled ‘penalties.’”). For a different 
view of the constitutional question, see generally Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the 
Power To Destroy: A Theory of the Tax Power for a Court that Limits the Commerce Power
(2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
16. See, e.g., Florida ex rel. Att’y Gen. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 
1314-17 (11th Cir. 2011) (concluding that the exaction for failure to maintain minimum 
coverage is not an exercise of the power to tax, in substantial part because Congress called 
the exaction a “penalty” rather than a “tax”). Because it was not briefed by either party, the 
Eleventh Circuit nowhere addressed the question whether the TAIA barred pre-enforcement 
litigation.
17. I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2006).
“early-bird special” indeed!
393
purpose of seeking clarification from the courts about the present and future 
legal obligations of the many individuals and entities subject to the ACA.
Treating the present lawsuits as seeking clarification of rights and duties 
rather than restraint of tax assessment or collection by the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) does not run afoul of the Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA). The 
DJA bars suits “with respect to Federal taxes.”18 This language is no obstacle 
because there are good reasons to agree with the courts and other authorities 
that have deemed it coextensive with the TAIA’s timing rule.19 But even if one 
were to read the DJA bar as broader than the TAIA timing rule, that would 
mean only that the particular remedy of a declaratory judgment would be 
unavailable in tax litigation. It would not follow that an otherwise permissible 
suit for injunctive relief would be barred by the DJA simply because the 
immediate purpose of the suit was to obtain something—clarification of rights 
and duties—that might also be obtained through a declaratory action, if the 
latter were proper.
In any event, our core argument does not depend on the assertion that the 
current ACA challenges affirmatively have the immediate purpose of seeking 
clarification; the crucial claim is that, in light of their filing date, these 
challenges do not have the immediate purpose of restraining the assessment or 
collection of taxes. The Supreme Court could hold that the current immediate 
purpose of the lawsuits is to restrain the IRS from taking steps preliminary to 
making assessments and collecting taxes, but not yet to restrain assessing or 
collecting. Alternatively, the Court could hold that one or more of the current 
lawsuits have the immediate purpose of seeking to enjoin other federal agencies 
from implementing the ACA in reliance upon the minimum coverage 
provision.20 Under either such reading, there is not even the hint of a conflict 
with the DJA.
18. 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006).
19. For a discussion of these decisions, see infra notes 70-75 and accompanying text. The 
Supreme Court has described the bar on declaratory action as “at least as broad” as the TAIA 
in its prohibition. Bob Jones I, 416 U.S. 725, 732 n.7 (1974).
20. None of the four leading federal appeals court cases originated with a complaint seeking 
relief solely against the IRS or Treasury Department. Each one named other agencies or 
department heads. See Amended Complaint, Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256 (N.D. Fla. 2011) (No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT), 2010 WL 
2114067; First Amended Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Mead v. Holder, 
766 F. Supp. 2d 16 (D.D.C. 2011) (No. 1:10-cv-00950-GK), 2010 WL 5827944; First 
Amended Complaint, Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 753 F. Supp. 2d 611 (W.D. Va. 2010) 
(No. 6:10-cv-00015-nkm), 2010 WL 5867473; Complaint, Thomas More Law Ctr. v. 
Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (No. 10-cv-11156), 2010 WL 4784409.
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Under our proposed reading, the TAIA does not (yet) bar prepayment 
challenges to the minimum coverage provision. Textualists and purposivists 
alike can embrace this reading. So can those who believe the ACA falls within 
congressional power as well as those who believe it is unconstitutional. In other 
words, our argument for eliminating the TAIA as a procedural barrier does not 
predetermine the outcome of the constitutional analysis of whether the ACA 
exaction is a tax under the federal tax power. Our reading of the TAIA is also 
consistent with the Supreme Court’s TAIA jurisprudence. And it avoids the 
potentially serious impediments to revenue collection that would exist if 
taxpayers could bring prepayment challenges after 2015.21
Part I of this Essay explains why it is so difficult to determine whether the 
ACA exaction for being uninsured meets the TAIA’s definition of a tax. Part II 
argues that the Supreme Court need not untangle this knot in the ACA 
litigation because there is a distinct reason why the TAIA does not bar the 
present suits to enjoin the minimum coverage provision. This Part also 
identifies the virtues of our reading of the TAIA. The Conclusion, counseling 
caution, recommends that Congress pass a special-purpose statute providing 
that the TAIA does not bar pre-enforcement challenges to the minimum 
coverage provision until the provision goes into effect.
i . is  the aca exaction a taia “tax”?
The TAIA bars actions to enjoin the assessment or collection of “any tax.”
One might think, therefore, that the key question for determining whether the 
suits challenging the ACA may go forward now is whether the ACA’s 
individual “penalty” for failure to satisfy the minimum coverage provision 
constitutes a “tax” under the TAIA.22 And indeed, that is more or less how the 
federal judges who have addressed the issue have conceptualized it.23 The 
judges who think that the ACA exaction does not count as a tax for purposes of 
the TAIA hold the TAIA bar inapplicable, while those who think that the ACA 
exaction does count as a tax for TAIA purposes hold that the bar applies.
21. See Liberty Univ., 2011 WL 3962915, at *41-43.
22. The ACA also imposes what might be regarded as a tax on large employers, in the form of 
an “assessable payment.” See id. at *2 (discussing ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1513, 124 Stat. 
119, 253 (2010) (to be codified at I.R.C. § 4980H)). For simplicity, here we consider only the 
minimum coverage provision and shared responsibility payment required of individuals.
23. We say “more or less” because another provision of the ACA sweeps in penalties that are 
collected in the same manner as taxes. See infra text accompanying notes 43-45.
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A. Why the ACA Exaction Might Be a TAIA “Tax”
The chief argument against applying the TAIA bar is extremely 
straightforward but, we contend, problematic nonetheless. The 
straightforward argument begins and ends with the observation that Congress 
was careful to avoid calling the penalty for failure to comply with the minimum 
coverage provision in the ACA a “tax”; therefore, it is not a tax under the 
TAIA.24 That’s the whole of it.
We should not be too quick to dismiss this line of reasoning as 
simpleminded, for it is less formalistic than it may appear. The Congress that 
enacted the ACA can be presumed to have been aware of the use of the 
triggering word “tax” in the TAIA, and it seems plausible that by pointedly 
refusing to call the ACA’s penalty provision a tax, it meant to exempt actions 
challenging the ACA from the TAIA’s litigation bar.
The difficulty with this line of reasoning is not its simplicity; that is a 
virtue. The problem is that the Congress that enacted the ACA may also be 
presumed to have been aware of the Supreme Court’s case law, and that case 
law has assiduously resisted a jurisprudence of labels. As the Fourth Circuit 
explained in its opinion dismissing the ACA challenges as barred by the TAIA, 
whether an exaction counts as a tax does not depend on whether Congress 
called the exaction a tax.25 Instead, the TAIA has been construed “to bar 
interference with the assessment of any exaction imposed by the [Internal 
Revenue] Code.”26 The Supreme Court cautioned against excessive formalism 
in the 1922 TAIA case Lipke v. Lederer,27 writing that “[t]he mere use of the 
word ‘tax’ . . . is not enough to show that within the true intendment of the 
term a tax was laid.”28
To be sure, Lipke held that an exaction may be labeled a tax and yet not 
trigger the TAIA bar. It did not say the converse: that an exaction that is not
labeled a tax may trigger the TAIA bar. Nor, indeed, does any Supreme Court 
24. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
25. See Liberty Univ., 2011 WL 3962915, at *6-7 (compiling cases supporting this proposition).
26. Id. at *6.
27. 259 U.S. 557 (1922).
28. Id. at 561. We have substituted an ellipsis for the following qualifier: “in an act primarily 
designed to define and suppress crime.” It could be argued that Lipke treats the “tax” label as 
insufficient to trigger the TAIA only because barring an injunctive action against a criminal 
law would raise due process questions not presented by the run-of-the-mill civil tax case. 
We agree that such considerations played an important role in the Lipke case itself, but we 
think that the excerpted quotation in the text accurately characterizes the functional nature 
of the case law more broadly, as we explain in the balance of this Part.
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case, although the doctrine arguably gestures in that direction. As the Fourth 
Circuit correctly observed, the Supreme Court cases in closely related areas 
define “tax” in functional terms.29
To be clear, if writing on a clean slate, the courts might have construed the 
TAIA to bar injunctions against only those exactions designated by the magic 
words “tax” or “taxes.” But given that the prior TAIA case law came down the 
other way, it is implausible to argue that Congress intended to render the TAIA 
bar inapplicable to the ACA simply by using the word “penalty” rather than 
“tax.”30 Were the Supreme Court now to say that Congress all along was 
assuming that only exactions denominated as taxes were protected against 
injunctive and declaratory suits, it would overturn well-established lower court 
case law affecting numerous provisions of law, not just the ACA.
The same problem infects a closely related argument that has been offered 
to render the TAIA bar inapplicable to the ACA. The D.C. Circuit majority 
contended that the TAIA did not apply because the plaintiffs did not sue “for 
the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax.”31 Rather, 
they sued “for the purpose of enjoining a regulatory command, the individual 
mandate, that requires them to purchase health insurance from private 
companies.”32 Yet this argument, if accepted by the Supreme Court, would cut 
deeply into the TAIA, because numerous provisions of the Internal Revenue 
Code have both regulatory and revenue-raising aspects.33
Equally problematically, the D.C. Circuit’s proposed purpose inquiry under 
the TAIA would stand the traditional view of the TAIA on its head. On the 
merits, the ACA’s challengers argue that the minimum coverage provision 
cannot be sustained as an exercise of Congress’s Article I taxing power because 
it seeks to regulate in the guise of a tax. Perhaps they are right; perhaps they 
are wrong. But the whole point of the TAIA is to require taxpayers making 
such claims to pay up first and then seek a refund,34 rather than to seek 
injunctive or declaratory relief first. If there is even a small possibility that the 
29. See Liberty Univ., 2011 WL 3962915, at *7 (“[T]he Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed 
that congressional labels have little bearing on whether an exaction qualifies as a ‘tax’ for 
statutory purposes.”).
30. See Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 23 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (“The 
fact that the Tax Code equates tax penalties to taxes for IRS assessment and collection 
purposes is known by Members of Congress who work on tax-related legislation . . . .”).
31. Id. at 5 (majority opinion) (quoting TAIA, I.R.C. § 7421(a)(2006)).
32. Id.
33. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 15 (discussing taxes with both regulatory and revenue-
raising purposes).
34. See discussion infra Section II.A.
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government could prevail on the merits of the constitutional challenge, then 
the TAIA bar applies.35 Thus, Supreme Court case law says that the ACA 
challengers’ suits should be allowed to bypass the TAIA only if they are clear 
winners.36 Yet, under the D.C. Circuit’s approach, the lawsuits can bypass the 
TAIA so long as they are not clear losers.37
B. Why the ACA Exaction Might Not Be a TAIA “Tax”
In light of all the contrary case law, how have some lower courts been able 
to find the TAIA bar inapplicable? The answer turns on an intricate parsing of 
the relevant statutes and cases. Although the D.C. Circuit majority said that 
“aside from the Fourth Circuit’s recent decision, no court has ever held that 
‘any tax’ under the Anti-Injunction Act includes exactions that Congress 
deliberately called ‘penalties,’”38 this appears to be an overstatement. Consider 
an amicus brief filed in the D.C. Circuit by two former Commissioners of the 
IRS. With ample supporting citations, the brief attests that prior to the ACA 
litigation, the lower courts had uniformly held that the TAIA blocks lawsuits to 
enjoin exactions denominated as “penalties.”39 The D.C. Circuit majority 
35. See United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 12 (2008) (“Despite [the
TAIA’s] broad and mandatory language, . . . ‘if it is clear that under no circumstances could 
the Government ultimately prevail, . . . the attempted collection may be enjoined if equity 
jurisdiction otherwise exists.’” (quoting Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 
U.S. 1, 7 (1962))); see also Bob Jones I, 416 U.S. 725, 742-46 (1974) (affirming the narrowness 
of the “no circumstances” exception).
36. For example, in Bailey v. George, 259 U.S. 16 (1922), the Supreme Court applied the TAIA 
bar to a lawsuit challenging a federal child labor tax on the ground that, although styled as a 
tax, the exaction was really a regulation. The same day, that very argument prevailed as a 
basis for invalidating the tax on the merits in Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 
(1922). The doctrinal basis for the substantive holding vanished when the Court overruled 
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918), in United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). 
Nonetheless, the core principle discernible in the two Bailey cases remains part of TAIA 
doctrine: an exaction may be unconstitutional—because it exceeds the scope of 
congressional power or for some other reason—but still qualify as a “tax” that triggers the 
TAIA prohibition.
37. For an argument that the ACA exaction is a tax for constitutional purposes once one puts 
aside labels, see generally Cooter & Siegel, supra note 15.
38. Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
39. See Corrected Brief of Amici Curiae Mortimer Caplin & Sheldon Cohen in Support of 
Appellees and Affirmance at 8-10, Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d 1 (No. 11-5047), 2011 WL 2349595, at 
*8 (collecting lower court cases with code provisions); see also Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 23
(Kavanaugh, J., dissenting) (noting that the “Tax Code equates tax penalties to taxes for 
numerous administrative purposes”).
the yale law journal online 121:389 2012
398
dismissed this line of attack by holding it inapplicable to “penalties assessed by 
[the] IRS but unrelated to taxes.”40
Taken at face value, the court’s reasoning is unpersuasive. If the 
applicability of the TAIA turns on whether Congress called an exaction a “tax”
or a “penalty,” it should not matter whether the penalty is related or unrelated 
to another tax. But the D.C. Circuit and the Sixth Circuit—which made the 
same argument—adduced some additional textual support for their position: 
Section 6671 of the Internal Revenue Code, they noted, deems some 
“penalties” imposed by some portion of the Code to be “taxes” for a variety of 
purposes.41 But, these courts further noted, the penalty for failing to maintain 
minimum coverage in the ACA is not contained in the part of the Code that is 
subject to this deeming provision. Thus, the D.C. and Sixth Circuits 
concluded, the penalty does not count as a tax for TAIA purposes.42
In our view, the foregoing close reading of the ACA, the rest of the Internal 
Revenue Code, and the TAIA provides the strongest grounds for concluding 
that a challenge to the ACA’s minimum coverage “penalty” is not a challenge to 
a “tax” under the TAIA. But it is hardly a slam dunk. As Judge Kavanaugh 
concluded in his dissent from the D.C. Circuit decision, yet another provision 
of the ACA—requiring that the penalty for failing to maintain minimum 
coverage be assessed and collected in the same manner as taxes43—does for that 
“penalty” what § 6671 does for other penalties: it deems the “penalty” a “tax.”44
After all, as Judge Kavanaugh observed, penalties for failing to maintain 
minimum coverage “can be assessed and collected in the same manner as taxes 
only if they are insulated from pre-enforcement suits under the [TAIA], as 
taxes are.”45
If that were not enough, the Fourth Circuit noted that the Internal Revenue 
Code itself expressly forbids just the sort of “intra-textualist” argument on 
which the D.C. Circuit relied: “Congress has forbidden courts from deriving 
any ‘inference’ or ‘implication’ from the ‘location or grouping of any particular 
40. Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 8.
41. I.R.C. § 6671 (2006).
42. Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 6-8; Thomas More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 539-40 (6th Cir. 
2011).
43. ACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat. 119, 249 (2010) (to be codified at I.R.C.
§ 5000A(g)(1)).
44. Seven-Sky, 661 F.3d at 35 (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
45. Id.
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section or provision or portion of this title.’”46 Thus, the Fourth Circuit 
concluded that nothing about § 6671 rendered the general proposition that 
penalties are taxes for purposes of the TAIA inapplicable to the ACA’s shared 
responsibility payment.47
C. A Reason To Worry About Relying on These Arguments
Who has the better of this complicated textual argument? We think 
reasonable minds can differ on that question. We would hope that in 
construing the relevant statutes, the Supreme Court would take account of the 
policy consequences.48 The conclusion that the ACA cannot be challenged until 
2015 could lead to the waste of tens of billions of dollars, should the Court 
eventually invalidate it.49 Therefore, pragmatic Supreme Court Justices would 
likely be inclined to try to find the TAIA bar inapplicable.
But no Supreme Court Justice is a thoroughgoing pragmatist. Textualists 
and even their fellow travelers—who constitute a majority on the current 
Court—could well be persuaded by the arguments advanced for the conclusion 
that the relevant statutory texts are best read to bar the current suits. The 
arguments for that conclusion, however, rest on the assumption that the 
dispositive question under the TAIA is whether the “penalty” for failing to 
maintain minimum coverage counts as a tax. The judges who have thus far 
46. Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 10-2347, 2011 WL 3962915, at *10 (4th Cir. Sept. 8, 2011) 
(quoting I.R.C. § 7806(b)).
47. See id. at *11 (“Specific direction that the term ‘tax’ in the [T]AIA encompass the individual 
mandate ‘penalty’ was . . . unnecessary.”).
48. The Court-appointed amicus curiae, in a brief that does not address our argument, boldly 
asserts that “[p]olicy considerations cannot justify departing from the explicit statutory 
language of a jurisdictional statute.” Brief for Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae Supporting 
Vacatur (Anti-Injunction Act) at 14, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. v. Florida, No. 
11-398 (U.S. Jan. 6, 2012).
49. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimated in May 2010 that implementing the ACA 
would cost the IRS and the Department of Health and Human Services between $10 billion 
and $20 billion over ten years. See Letter from Douglas Elmendorf, Dir. of the CBO, to Hon. 
Jerry Lewis (May 11, 2010), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/114xx/doc11490/
LewisLtr_HR3590.pdf. Some substantial fraction of that cost would be frontloaded startup 
costs that would need to be expended before 2015. The same is true of costs for states, 
employers, insurers, and private individuals. Although we have found no comprehensive 
estimate of the unrecoverable startup costs for complying with the ACA, we are confident 
that it would have to be reckoned in many billions of dollars. See id. (estimating some of the 
effects of the ACA on discretionary spending by the federal government and forecasting that 
they would “probably exceed $115 billion over the 2010-2019 period”).
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addressed the issue have all shared that assumption,50 leading to a detailed and 
highly technical battle over what counts as a tax under the TAIA. Fortunately, 
the ACA litigation does not require the Supreme Court to untangle this knot, 
as the next Part explains.
ii . a fresh start
Even if one accepts that the ACA exaction for being uninsured qualifies as a 
“tax” for purposes of the TAIA, there is a different reason why the TAIA does 
not bar the current suits to enjoin the ACA: because the exaction does not go 
into effect until 2014, the present challenges to the ACA do not fall within the 
TAIA’s prohibition of suits having “the purpose of restraining the assessment 
or collection of any tax.”51
A. A Narrower Reading of the TAIA
The Fourth Circuit conveyed the standard interpretation of the TAIA. “By 
its terms,” the court wrote, “the [T]AIA bars suits seeking to restrain the 
assessment or collection of a tax. Thus, the [T]AIA forbids only pre-
enforcement actions brought before the [government] has assessed or collected 
an exaction.”52 The court noted that “[a] taxpayer can always pay an 
assessment, seek a refund directly from the IRS, and then bring a refund action 
in federal court.”53 Decades earlier, in Bob Jones University v. Simon (Bob Jones 
I), the Court was more tentative. “[I]t may be possible to conclude,” the Court 
wrote, “that a suit for a refund is not ‘for the purpose of restraining the 
assessment or collection of any tax . . . ,’ and thus that neither the literal terms
nor the principal purpose of § 7421(a) is applicable.”54
50. The TAIA would not bar the current litigation if it were regarded as a merits defense that 
could be waived by the government, rather than as a limit on federal court jurisdiction. See
Patrick J. Smith, Is the Anti-Injunction Act Jurisdictional?, 133 TAX NOTES 1093 (2011) (arguing 
that the TAIA is not jurisdictional, notwithstanding the Supreme Court’s assertion to the 
contrary in Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 5 (1962)). Not 
surprisingly, given the existence of Supreme Court precedent directly on point, the lower 
courts have not questioned the jurisdictional status of the TAIA. We express no view on the 
question here.
51. I.R.C. § 7421(a) (2006).
52. Liberty Univ., 2011 WL 3962915, at *4.
53. Id. (citing United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 4-5 (2008)).
54. 416 U.S. 725, 748 n.22 (1974).
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The Court may have been tentative because the literal language of the 
statute arguably extends to refund actions. Just because “the [T]AIA bars suits 
seeking to restrain the assessment or collection of a tax,” it does not necessarily 
follow that “the [T]AIA forbids only pre-enforcement actions brought before
the [government] has assessed or collected an exaction.”55 This is because 
refund actions, in addition to having the purpose of obtaining a refund of an 
exaction already paid, can also have the purpose of restraining the assessment 
or collection of future exactions.56 Indeed, the plaintiff in a refund action may 
be more concerned about paying the exaction year after year than she is about 
having paid it once. Deprived by the TAIA itself of the ability to obtain 
injunctive or declaratory relief without first paying some tax, a taxpayer may 
bring her refund action chiefly for the purpose of resolving questions regarding 
her future tax liability.
Indeed, that is exactly what Bob Jones University did. After the Supreme 
Court held in Bob Jones I that the TAIA barred Bob Jones University’s attempt 
to obtain an injunction against the IRS’s revocation of its tax-exempt status, 
the university paid a tiny amount of unemployment tax and then sued for a 
refund of $21(!) in federal court.57 That suit involved review of the question of 
§ 501(c)(3) status, because the university would have been exempt from the 
unemployment tax if it had been entitled to such status.58
But reading the literal language of the TAIA as barring refund actions 
would be absurd. It would mean that individuals could not challenge a federal 
exaction at any time, even though Congress has elsewhere specifically 
authorized refund actions.59 The whole point of the TAIA is for the taxpayer to 
sue later, not never. To avoid this absurd conclusion, the Court has read the 
TAIA in light of what it has called its “principal” and “collateral” purposes.
In Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., the Court identified “[t]he 
manifest purpose of § 7421(a)” as “to permit the United States to assess and 
collect taxes alleged to be due without judicial intervention, and to require that 
55. See Liberty Univ., 2011 WL 3962915, at *4 (citing Clintwood Elkhorn, 553 U.S. at 4-5).
56. Cf. Bob Jones I, 416 U.S. at 748 n.22 (“And there would be serious question about the 
reasonableness of a system that forced a § 501(c)(3) organization to bring a series of 
backward-looking refund suits in order to establish repeatedly the legality of its claim to tax-
exempt status and that precluded such an organization from obtaining prospective relief 
even though it utilized an avenue of review mandated by Congress.”).
57. Bob Jones Univ. v. United States (Bob Jones II), 461 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1983).
58. The Supreme Court ultimately held that Bob Jones University did not qualify as a tax-
exempt organization under § 501(c)(3) because of its racially discriminatory admissions and 
disciplinary policies, notwithstanding the religious basis for those policies. Id. at 605.
59. See I.R.C. § 7422 (2006).
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the legal right to the disputed sums be determined in a suit for refund.”60 “In 
this manner,” the Court stressed, “the United States is assured of prompt 
collection of its lawful revenue.”61 Similarly, the Bob Jones I Court described 
“the protection of the Government’s need to assess and collect taxes as 
expeditiously as possible with a minimum of pre-enforcement judicial 
interference” as the TAIA’s “principal purpose.”62 It then observed that “[t]he 
Court has also identified ‘a collateral objective of the Act—protection of the 
collector from litigation pending a suit for refund.’”63 The Bob Jones I Court 
noted that refund suits implicate neither “the principal purpose” of the TAIA 
nor its “‘collateral objective.’”64
Reading the TAIA in light of its purposes to avoid absurdity, the Court has, 
in effect, construed the statutory language as if it barred suits brought for the
immediate purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax. 
Refund actions have the immediate purpose of obtaining a refund of an 
exaction already paid. Thus they do not have the immediate purpose of 
restraining the assessment or collection of a future exaction, even if that is their 
main purpose. That is why the Court has not construed the TAIA to bar them, 
notwithstanding the literal language of the statute.65
60. 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962); see id. at 5 (“The object of § 7421(a) is to withdraw jurisdiction from the 
state and federal courts to entertain suits seeking injunctions prohibiting the collection of 
federal taxes.”).
61. Id. at 7.
62. Bob Jones I, 416 U.S. at 736 (citing Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 7).
63. Id. at 737 (quoting Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 7-8).
64. Id. at 748 n.22 (quoting Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 7-8).
65. In South Carolina v. Regan, the Court held that the TAIA “was not intended to bar an action 
where . . . Congress has not provided the plaintiff with an alternative legal way to challenge 
the validity of a tax.” 465 U.S. 367, 373 (1984). The Court based this conclusion on “the Act’s 
purposes and the circumstances of its enactment.” Id. at 381. The Court did not explain how 
its interpretation of the TAIA was supported by the text of the statute. Likewise, in Miller v. 
Standard Nut Margarine Co. of Florida, the Court held that the predecessor version of the
TAIA implicitly contained an exception permitting injunctive actions in “extraordinary and 
exceptional circumstances.” 284 U.S. 498, 509-10 (1932). The Court subsequently invoked 
Standard Nut Margarine in Williams Packing as support for the proposition that the TAIA 
does not bar relief “if it is clear that under no circumstances could the Government 
ultimately prevail.” 370 U.S. at 7. Yet neither Standard Nut Margarine nor Williams Packing 
attempted to tie the exception to any language in the Act. See Standard Nut Margarine, 284 
U.S. at 509 (finding no evidence that Congress intended to depart from the traditional 
equity practice of affording exceptions in extraordinary circumstances, without looking for 
any statutory language creating an exception); see also Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 7 
(“[T]he central purpose of the Act is inapplicable . . . .”). These cases show that, in the past, 
the Court has been willing to root exceptions to the TAIA in the Act’s purposes, without 
regard to any specific text. Our proposal, by contrast, does construe specific language in the 
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To be sure, we have found no authority on the question of whether courts 
may issue injunctions in refund actions, but the absence of authority may 
simply reflect the fact that taxpayers do not experience the need to seek 
injunctions in refund actions. Why not? Because they know that they can 
depend on the collateral estoppel effect of the decision in a refund suit should 
the same issues involving the same taxpayer arise in future years. Collateral 
estoppel does not by itself enjoin the IRS from reassessing or recollecting the 
tax, but it would be a waste of everyone’s time for the IRS to do so when the 
taxpayer will win on collateral estoppel grounds—and similarly situated 
taxpayers will win their cases as well on grounds of precedent. Accordingly, the 
IRS does not assess and attempt to collect a second time when it is sure to lose. 
The practical effect of a successful refund action is very similar to that of an 
injunction.
More importantly, even if we were to assume that an injunction is 
technically unavailable in a refund action, one still must explain how the 
language of the TAIA permits refund actions like Bob Jones II. In such cases, the 
taxpayer’s undoubted subjective “purpose” in the sense of motive is to restrain 
the assessment or collection of future taxes, even though the mechanism of 
restraint is the pleading of collateral estoppel or precedent in a future case. In 
other words, the ability of the taxpayer to plead collateral estoppel or precedent 
in a second refund action discourages the IRS from assessing or attempting to 
collect the tax the second time, and that discouragement is the primary 
motive—but not the immediate purpose—of the refund action in a case like Bob 
Jones II.66
When the TAIA is read in line with Williams Packing and Bob Jones I—that 
is, to bar suits with the immediate purpose of restraining tax assessment or 
collection—the question presented by the ACA litigation is whether pre-
enforcement challenges at this time have the immediate purpose of restraining 
the assessment or collection of the ACA exaction. The answer is “no,” because 
the legal authority to assess and collect the ACA exaction will not exist until 
2015.67 The immediate purpose cannot be to restrain assessment or collection 
TAIA and thus should appeal to textualists as well as purposivists. See infra text 
accompanying notes 76-79.
66. Cf. Alexander v. “Americans United” Inc., 416 U.S. 752, 760-61 (1974) (noting that a lawsuit 
motivated by the purpose of reassuring donors about tax deductibility was nonetheless for 
the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of taxes where restraining assessment 
or collection was the means of providing reassurance).
67. When we say that legal authority to assess and collect does not yet exist, we mean that such 
authority may not lawfully be exercised any time soon. In other words, we mean that the 
events that will give rise to the possibility of an assessment have not occurred yet. We do not
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until the relevant agencies gain the authority to assess and collect, just as the 
immediate purpose cannot be to restrain assessment or collection after that 
authority has been exercised. The Court in Williams Packing ruled 
authoritatively that, “in general, the [TAIA] prohibits suits for injunctions 
barring the collection of federal taxes when the collecting officers have made 
the assessment and claim that it is valid.”68 Because the ACA litigation will take 
place before the collecting officers will have the authority to make any 
assessments, this animating purpose of the statute simply does not apply.
What, then, is the immediate purpose of the present challenges to the 
minimum coverage provision? Rather than having the immediate purpose of 
restraining the assessment or collection of taxes, these suits can be understood 
to have the immediate purpose of seeking clarification from the federal courts 
about the present and future legal obligations of the many individuals and 
entities subject to the ACA. In other words, when legal authority to assess or 
collect an exaction does not yet exist, a suit challenging the exaction is better 
understood as having the immediate purpose of obtaining guidance from the 
federal judiciary than as having the immediate purpose of restraining 
assessment or collection.
B. The Declaratory Judgment Act Is No Barrier to This Reading
One might object that a lawsuit with the purpose of seeking guidance is 
still a forbidden lawsuit. On this view, the fact that Congress prohibited 
declaratory judgment actions “with respect to Federal taxes”69 shows that it 
meant to block even the taxpayer who seeks guidance. After all, guidance-
seeking is invariably the purpose of lawsuits for declaratory relief.
There may be two versions of this objection. One version asserts that an 
injunctive action for the purpose of seeking guidance is really a declaratory 
judgment action “with respect to Federal taxes,” which, per the terms of the 
DJA, cannot be brought.70 We question the premise of this claim. After all, a
declaratory action that accomplishes the same thing that could have been 
accomplished in a suit for injunctive relief is just as readily viewed as really an 
injunctive action.
mean that the tax is not yet due. Nor do we mean that the IRS may not act until Congress 
grants it further authority.
68. Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 8.
69. Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA), 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2006).
70. Cf. Bob Jones I, 416 U.S. 725, 732-33 n.7 (1974) (“Nor need we decide whether any action for 
an injunction is of necessity a request for a declaration of rights that triggers the terms of the 
Declaratory Judgment Act.”).
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Even granting the premise, it does not follow that the DJA blocks the 
present ACA challenges. The Supreme Court asserted in Bob Jones I that there 
was a division of authority on the question of whether the DJA bar on tax 
litigation is coextensive with or broader than the TAIA bar.71 This division, 
however, is hardly even. The Court cited three lower federal court cases 
concluding that the limits are coextensive and none opining to the contrary.72
Moreover, the leading federal practice treatise concludes that the limitation on 
tax-related declaratory judgment actions “reflects the same vital policy that 
underlies the [tax] anti-injunction act.”73 This authority comports with the 
history of the DJA, which did not originally contain a prohibition on tax 
litigation. Congress amended the statute in 1935 in response to lawsuits that 
sought to use it to circumvent the prohibition on injunctive relief.74 Against all 
of this authority, the Bob Jones I Court offered three citations for the 
proposition that the DJA bar may be broader than the TAIA bar, but none of 
the cited sources really makes that point, beyond noting that the DJA lacks 
some of the TAIA’s express exceptions.75 Accordingly, when the explicit 
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. 13D WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3580, at 712 (3d ed. 2008).
74. See “Americans United” Inc. v. Walters, 477 F.2d 1169, 1175-76 (D.C. Cir. 1973), rev’d on 
other grounds sub nom. Alexander v. “Americans United” Inc., 416 U.S. 752 (1974) (citing the 
DJA’s legislative history for the conclusion that its prohibition on tax litigation is 
coextensive with the TAIA).
75. See Bob Jones I, 416 U.S. at 732 n.7 (citing S. REP. NO. 74-1240 (1935); EDWIN BORCHARD,
DECLARATORY JUDGMENTS (2d ed. 1941); and Boris I. Bittker & Kenneth M. Kaufman, Taxes 
and Civil Rights: “Constitutionalizing” the Internal Revenue Code, 82 YALE L.J. 51 (1972)). 
Borchard worried that the Senate Report indicated that the government sought a broader 
prohibition in the DJA than the exception-riddled TAIA, but he nonetheless said that the 
“sounder view” would be to read the statutes as coextensive. BORCHARD, supra, at 855. 
Bittker and Kaufman simply relied on Borchard, but without acknowledging Borchard’s 
counsel that the courts should construe the DJA restriction to mirror the TAIA. See Bittker & 
Kaufman, supra, at 58 (“Professor Borchard argued that the 1935 amendment was more 
restrictive than the [TAIA] . . . .”). The 1935 Senate Report itself contains exactly one 
relevant paragraph on the DJA. It states:
Your committee has added an amendment making it clear that the Federal 
Declaratory Judgment[] Act of June 14, 1934, has no application to Federal taxes. 
The application of the Declaratory Judgment[] Act to taxes would constitute a 
radical departure from the long-continued policy of Congress (as expressed in 
Rev. Stat. 3224 and other provisions) with respect to the determination, 
assessment, and collection of Federal taxes. Your committee believes that the 
orderly and prompt determination and collection of Federal taxes should not be 
interfered with by a procedure designed to facilitate the settlement of private 
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exceptions in each statute are inapplicable, the DJA should be construed to 
allow tax litigation whenever the TAIA allows such litigation.
According to the second version of the potential objection based on the 
DJA, the DJA’s prohibition on tax-related litigation shows that Congress 
meant to bar such litigation even when the immediate purpose of that litigation 
is clarification, because clarification is always the objective of a declaratory suit. 
Because Congress has not allowed tax-related declaratory actions for 
clarification, this argument goes, Congress also would not want to permit tax-
related injunctive suits.
This second objection may not be distinguishable from the claim that a 
clarification-seeking injunctive action is really a declaratory judgment action. If 
it cannot be distinguished, then our foregoing response should suffice to 
answer the objection when thus rephrased.
To the extent that the second version of the objection makes a distinct 
point, it does not go to the heart of our proposal. Our key point is that a 
current challenge to the ACA does not have the immediate purpose of 
restraining the assessment or collection of a tax, because a tax that has not yet 
come into existence cannot be assessed or collected. We have said that the 
immediate purpose of the current litigation is to seek judicial guidance, but we 
might equally have argued that the present ACA challenges have the immediate 
purpose of restraining the establishment of the taxing authority, or that they 
have the immediate purpose of restraining the government from taking any steps 
necessary to make assessments and collect revenues once the taxing authority 
does exist. The precise affirmative characterization of the immediate purpose of 
the current lawsuits is much less important than understanding that their 
immediate purpose does not make them subject to the TAIA. So long as the 
immediate purpose is characterized as something other than guidance-
seeking—as it readily and honestly can be characterized—one need not worry 
about even the appearance of a conflict with the DJA.
controversies, and that existing procedure both in the Board of Tax Appeals and 
the courts affords ample remedies for the correction of tax errors.
S. REP. NO. 74-1240, supra, at 11. We find this language unclear and thus mostly unhelpful. 
On the one hand, the sweeping assertion that the DJA “has no application to Federal taxes” 
suggests a ban that could be more far-reaching than the TAIA timing rule. On the other 
hand, the Report’s invocation of the “determination, assessment, and collection of Federal 
taxes” echoes the language of the TAIA, suggesting that the amendment was intended to 
ensure that the DJA tax-litigation exclusion would be interpreted in parallel with the TAIA. 
We see nothing in the legislative history or logic that supplies a reason why Congress would 
wish to make it more difficult to obtain declaratory relief than to obtain injunctive relief in 
tax cases. In general, declaratory relief is considered less intrusive than injunctive relief, not 
more intrusive.
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C. The Virtues of Our Approach
To return to our affirmative case, our reading of the TAIA has four main 
virtues. First, textualists and purposivists alike can embrace it. This reading 
will appeal to textualists because, as used in the statute, “the purpose” must
mean “the immediate purpose” or otherwise risk creating absurd results.76 After 
all, anytime anyone brings a lawsuit, he may have several purposes: to obtain 
money, to prevent certain behavior by the defendant in the future, to have his 
day in court, to prove a point, and so forth. Accordingly, to make sense of the 
singular phrase “the purpose” in the TAIA, one must ask what it is doing in the 
statute. Given the context—which includes Congress’s providing for refund 
actions in another Internal Revenue Code section—the phrase “the purpose” in 
the statute must refer to the immediate purpose.77
Purposivists can embrace our reading of the TAIA because pre-enforcement 
challenges to exactions that the government does not yet have authority to 
assess or collect do not implicate “the manifest purpose of §7421(a),” which, to 
reiterate, “is to permit the United States to assess and collect taxes alleged to be 
due without judicial intervention, and to require that the legal right to the 
disputed sums be determined in a suit for refund.”78 Nor does permitting pre-
2015 lawsuits frustrate the TAIA’s “collateral purpose” of protecting the tax 
collector from potentially vexatious litigation. That collateral purpose 
ultimately serves to protect “collecting officers [who] have made the 
assessment and claim that it is valid.”79 Where there has been no assessment 
because no taxing authority yet exists, there is no vexation.
76. Cf. John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2391 (2003) (“[E]ven 
the staunchest modern textualists still embrace and apply, even if rarely, at least some 
version of the absurdity doctrine.”).
77. One might instead say that “the purpose” of a lawsuit is simply the judicial action sought in 
the complaint’s prayer for relief. Taking such a view, one could then argue that a prayer for 
relief is TAIA-barred when it seeks to enjoin the assessment or collection of taxes. Under 
this close cousin of our view, the current ACA litigation would be permissible insofar as it 
does not seek to enjoin assessment or collection of any tax by the IRS but seeks instead to 
enjoin the IRS from taking preparatory steps aimed at implementing the assessment and 
collection authority in 2015. Alternatively, the current litigation seeks to enjoin other federal 
agencies from implementing the ACA in reliance upon the minimum coverage provision. 
Thus, for example, a prayer for relief seeking to “enjoin the enforcement of” the ACA in a 
complaint filed in 2010 is permissible on this view, as on our own. Complaint, Thomas 
More Law Ctr. v. Obama, 720 F. Supp. 2d 882 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (No. 2:10-cv-11156), 2010 
WL 4784409.
78. Enochs v. Williams Packing & Navigation Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7 (1962).
79. Id. at 8.
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Second, unlike readings of the TAIA that focus on the meaning of the word 
“tax,” our construction of the statute does not in any way affect the merits of 
the question whether the exaction for being uninsured in the ACA is a “tax” or 
a “penalty” for constitutional purposes. There is no relationship between the 
immediate purpose of a suit challenging an exaction and the constitutional 
status of that exaction. By contrast, there is arguably some relationship 
between statutory and constitutional definitions of the word “tax.”80 A Justice 
who persuades herself that the ACA exaction is not a tax under the TAIA in 
order to reach the merits may find that this conclusion predisposes her to reject 
the argument that the ACA exaction is within the scope of Congress’s tax 
power. Our reading of the TAIA enables the Court to reach the merits without 
prejudging the merits.
Third, our reading of the TAIA is consistent with Supreme Court 
precedent. This is a case of first impression: in no previous TAIA case did the 
Court confront the situation presented by the ACA and have to decide whether 
the TAIA applied when legal authority to assess and collect the challenged 
exaction did not yet exist.
Fourth, unlike readings of the TAIA that place the ACA exaction outside its 
purview for all time, our reading does not pose “serious long-term 
consequences for the Secretary’s revenue collection.”81 The Fourth Circuit, in 
ruling that the TAIA barred all pre-enforcement challenges to the ACA 
exaction, wrote that “[t]o exempt the individual mandate from the [T]AIA 
would invite millions of taxpayers—each and every year—to refuse to pay the 
§ 5000A(b) exaction and instead preemptively challenge the IRS’s 
assessment.”82 Our reading of the TAIA poses no such problem; it justifies pre-
enforcement challenges to the ACA exaction only until 2015, during which time 
no assessments or collections will take place.
80. See, e.g., Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, No. 10-2347, 2011 WL 3962915, at *21 (4th Cir. 
Sept. 8, 2011) (Wynn, J., concurring) (“[W]ere I to rule on the merits . . . , I would uphold 
the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act on the basis that Congress had the authority 
to enact the individual and employer mandates, which operate as taxes, under its taxing 
power. Accordingly, I must agree with Judge Motz that the [T]AIA bars this suit.”).
81. Id. at *14 (majority opinion).
82. Id.; see also id. (“Moreover, some of those taxpayers will undoubtedly possess a host of non-
constitutional, individual grounds upon which to challenge the assessment of the 
§ 5000A(b) exaction. . . . This would threaten to interrupt the IRS’s collection of $4 billion 
annually from the challenged exaction. Moreover, those challenges could impede the 
collection of other income taxes by preemptively resolving—in litigation over the exaction 
imposed by § 5000A(b)—issues basic to all tax collection, such as a taxpayer’s adjusted gross 
income.” (citations omitted)).
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To be sure, it is possible to imagine a reductio of our view. Suppose that 
Congress enacted a prospective change in the tax law that was scheduled to go 
into effect one week after enactment. Could taxpayers bring pre-enforcement 
challenges to the new law for just that one week? If not, how long must the 
delay be before the TAIA is rendered inapplicable? And if one accepts our view 
that lawsuits are permitted before the authority to tax goes into effect, why not 
permit lawsuits before an extant tax becomes due for a particular taxpayer in 
any given year or quarter?
We think that this line of objections calls for line-drawing rather than 
abandonment of our analysis. Various lines might be defended as ways to 
distinguish an objective immediate purpose of restraining tax assessment or 
collection from another objective immediate purpose. One sensible test would 
ask whether it appears likely that the litigation, including all appeals, would be 
completed before the tax goes into effect. Such a test would require a court to 
make an ex ante determination of the likely length of litigation. That sort of 
determination is familiar to the law of federal jurisdiction.83
Alternatively, one might worry that courts would have difficulty predicting 
when litigation would be completed. If so, one could opt for a more mechanical 
rule: litigation filed before the assessment or collection authority goes into 
effect would be permissible at that time, but the case would be dismissed under 
the TAIA if it were still pending when a tax becomes assessable or collectable. 
Under such a regime, plaintiffs would have to weigh the risk that a pre-
enforcement challenge would be dismissed before final judgment against the 
expected value of a judgment obtained before the TAIA bar becomes 
applicable.
The choice between the two sorts of line-drawing approaches is more 
theoretical than real, because Congress rarely enacts an exaction but delays its 
implementation long enough to make full litigation feasible. Moreover, the 
current challenges to the ACA should fall on the permissible side of the line 
however it is drawn: Supreme Court review of these actions will be completed 
years before the minimum coverage provision or the exaction for remaining 
uninsured goes into effect.
Judge Kavanaugh commented in his impressive opinion that “there is no 
‘early-bird special’ exception to the Anti-Injunction Act,” and that “creating 
83. See Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 353 (1961) (“The general federal rule has 
long been to decide what the amount in controversy is [for federal jurisdictional statutes]
from the complaint itself, unless it appears or is in some way shown that the amount stated 
in the complaint is not claimed ‘in good faith.’” (quoting St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. 
Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288 (1938))).
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such an exception would pose a host of arbitrary line-drawing problems.”84
Adoption of our interpretation of the TAIA would permit the Supreme Court 
to reach the merits of the current ACA litigation without worrying about the 
line-drawing problems that concerned the lower courts: the casuistic question 
of what counts as a TAIA “tax.”
Judge Kavanaugh did not consider our interpretation of the statute because 
no one had yet offered it. His “early-bird special” image is thus humorous but 
(understandably) unresponsive. Whether pre-enforcement challenges to the 
ACA should be barred after the provision goes into effect will turn on whether 
the exaction is deemed a “tax” for purposes of the TAIA, but an authoritative 
Supreme Court ruling on the substantive issues during the current Term 
would obviate the need for most such challenges.
conclusion
In light of the daunting number of individuals and entities who require 
guidance from the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of the minimum 
coverage provision, resolving the present challenges by the end of the current 
Term would be in the public interest. We have offered a reading of the TAIA 
that makes sense of its text and purposes and that would allow this to happen. 
We cannot know the likelihood that five Justices will be persuaded either by 
our reading of the statute or by an alternative reading that also will allow the 
Supreme Court to reach the merits.
There is a simple solution to this uncertainty. Congress could pass a 
special-purpose statute stating that the TAIA does not bar pre-enforcement 
challenges to the minimum coverage provision until the provision goes into 
effect.85 There is no dispute about the authority of Congress to pass such a law. 
It has taken similar action in the past.86 Moreover, if the political branches 
were to turn their attention to the matter, there is good cause to expect that the 
84. Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 46 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting).
85. For an example of a straightforward proposal that Congress could enact, see Steve R. 
Johnson, The Anti-Injunction Act and the Individual Mandate, 133 TAX NOTES 1395, 1401-02 
(2011). Such a statute could specify that it renders the TAIA (and possibly the DJA tax-
litigation bar) inapplicable only to lawsuits filed before a specified date.
86. See, e.g., Liberty Univ., 2011 WL 3962915, at *14 (noting that Congress enacted such a 
provision after Bob Jones I). There is a statutory exception to the TAIA for exemption cases—
I.R.C. § 7428(a) (2006)—which allows organizations whose tax-exempt status has been
denied or revoked to sue for a declaratory judgment on that question, without having to tee 
up a refund suit.
“early-bird special” indeed!
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bill would pass both chambers and be signed into law by the President. The 
time for Congress and the Obama Administration to act is now.
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